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WORK MADE FOR HIGHER UNDERSTANDING OF
THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976:
HI-TECH VIDEO PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. CAPITAL CITIES/
ABC, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.1 is a
strict interpretation by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit of the "work made for hire" doctrine. 2 The phrase
"work made for hire" is codified in copyright law under 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b), which states that the employer or person for whom the
work is prepared is considered the author of the work for purposes
of copyright registration and ownership.3 Traditionally, an artist
could easily hire help, use that help to create copyrightable mate-
rial, and register a copyright in that material. 4 Presently, and with
an awareness of the Sixth Circuit's strict interpretation of this doc-
1. 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995).
2. "Work made for hire" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which states, in perti-
nent part, that a "work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compila-
tion, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1977).
4. Decisions prior to 1989 were based on a much broader definition of "work
made for hire." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiege4 Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), upheld the trial
court instruction which read:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an employee
working within the scope of his employment. What that means is, a per-
son acting under the direction and supervision of the hiring author, at
the hiring author's instance and expense. It does not matter whether the
for-hire creator is an employee in the sense of having a regular job with
the hiring author. What matters is whether the hiring author caused the
work to be made and exercised the right to direct and supervise the
creation.
Id. at 551. Other jurisdictions followed the Aldon court. See, e.g., Evans Newton
Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986) (agreeing with Aldon
analysis); Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (citing and following Aldon).
The test set forth in Aldon is simpler and broader in scope than that followed
today. For a discussion of the test followed today, see infra notes 86-99 and accom-
panying text.
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trine, those interested in obtaining copyrights on works created
with the help of others should take heed.5 Currently, care must be
taken to execute the production of copyrightable material in ac-
cordance with this new strict definition 6 if one wishes to register a
copyright in the work as his own. 7
Hi-Tech specifically addresses the common law interpretation
of 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). 8 Because no definition is given in the statute
itself for "employee," courts have struggled to give the word a pre-
cise meaning. 9 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,1° the
Supreme Court set forth a list of elements which, when applied to
certain employment situations, purports to determine whether the
employee is included within the copyright statute.' Those ele-
ments, however, must be applied to the facts of every case, and
courts have not done so with consistency. 12 This Note analyzes the
elements currently relevant to determine whether someone is an
5. Under the Hi-Tech analysis, it is more difficult for an employer to hire help
for a particular work and still protect that work under copyright law. The em-
ployer must meet strict criteria if he wishes to copyright the work completed with
the help of his hired parties. For a short explanation of the development of the
test, see infra notes 6-13 and accompanying text. Prior to 1989, many courts used
the broad test set forth in Aldon, 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), to determine
whether a work was indeed one "made for hire." In 1989, the Supreme Court
narrowed the test in Communityfor Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit further constricted the
doctrine by interpreting the Reid test narrowly in Hi-Tech. For a more detailed
discussion of the progression of the doctrine, see infra notes 34-121 and accompa-
nying text.
6. The strict test is set forth at infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, the Hi-Tech court rigidly applied the facts of the case to this already strict
test of over ten different elements. The result is a very narrow field within which
an employer may operate and still register a copyright in his works. For a more
detailed discussion of this strict test and how it was applied in Hi-Tech, see infra
notes 123-173 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of what is needed to establish a work as one made for hire,
see infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. Aldon was specifically rejected by the
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
8. Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1095. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
stated, "Hi-Tech does not claim that the parties signed a written agreement to
consider the video a 'work made for hire.' Thus, we are not asked to find Hi-
Tech's copyright valid under § 101 (2) of the Act." Id.
9. For a general discussion of the complexity of the "work made for hire"
doctrine, see generally Charles D. Ossola, Copyright Ownership and Transfer, 411
Pu/PAT 431 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works
Made For Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA.
L. REv. 1281 (1987).
10. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
11. See id. at 751-52. For a discussion of Reid and a list of the elements, see
infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
12. See Ossola, supra note 9.
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"employee" within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976,13 and
how courts should apply those elements.
This Note begins with a discussion of the facts surrounding Hi-
Tech Video Productions, Inc. Section III focuses on the background of
statutory and case law upon which the Sixth Circuit relied in reach-
ing its holding. Section IV examines specifically the Sixth Circuit's
analysis in Hi-Tech. Section V explores the two leading cases de-
cided between Reid and Hi-Tech, and how these cases may have in-
fluenced the outcome of Hi-Tech. Section VI discusses the impact
of Hi-Tech on the future of the "work made for hire" doctrine and
the rights of the employer to claim work as his own.
II. FACTS
Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. (Hi-Tech) was a business en-
gaged in the production and creation of commercials and other
promotional video tapes. 14 Hi-Tech was owned solely by Stan
Akey.15 In May of 1990, Hi-Tech released a video entitled "Macki-
nac Island: The Mackinac Video."16 To aid him in the production
and creation of this video, Akey hired three assistants. 17 Ted Cline
was hired as an aerial videographer, Steve Cook as a scriptwriter/
narrator, and Michael Mueller as the principal videographer.' 8
Upon completion, Akey registered a copyright in the video. 19 This
copyright registration became effective on August 3, 1990 as a
"work made for hire."20 In early 1990, the producers of "Good
Morning America," an ABC morning news and information show,
featured a story on Mackinac Island's annual Lilac Festival.21 On
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1977).
14. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1094. Most of the videos and tapes created by Hi-
Tech were produced at the request of clients. See id. As in this case, however,
some videos were created independent of any client request. See id.
15. See id. at 1094.
16. See id. Mackinac Island is a tourist attraction, and the video was intended
to promote travel to the island. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1094. Ted Cline provided his own plane. See id.
19. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1094.
20. See id.
21. See id. Donna Vislocky, an associate producer of Good Morning America
was responsible for preparing the background video for the Mackinac feature. See
id. Vislocky obtained footage from the Hi-Tech video through the executive direc-
tor of the Mackinac Island Chamber of Commerce and used parts of the Hi-Tech
video for her broadcast feature video. See id. at 1094-95. At trial, Vislocky con-
tended that she "received permission for such use from the Chamber of Com-
merce, which she believed owned the video." Id. at 1095. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan resolved this factual issue
against ABC. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
1997]
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June 8, 1990, the show aired with footage from Hi-Tech's video,
though without Hi-Tech's narration or music. 2 2 As a result, Akey
sued Good Morning America and ABC for infringement of his
copyrighted Mackinac Video. 23
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, at the end of a two day bench trial, denied ABC's motion
to dismiss the complaint due to the invalidity of Hi-Tech's copy-
right.2 4 The district court entered judgment in favor of Hi-Tech,
"rejected ABC's affirmative defense of fair use,25 trebled the award
of damages in light of ABC's 'willful' infringement of copyright,
and awarded Hi-Tech attorney's fees and costs."2 6 The Sixth Circuit
reviewed the case de novo,2 7 made several factual determinations
and reversed the district court.28 The court held that the video was
not "work made for hire."29
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that the definition of "work
made for hire" set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101 and developed by the
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid ° does
not support a finding that the three subcontractors hired by Akey
were employees within the meaning of the statute.31 The Sixth Cir-
cuit found that Akey's control over his assistants' work was not sig-
nificant, that Akey himself viewed his assistants as independent
contractors, and that Akey ran his business such that it was within
stated that the question of whether ABC had permission need not be answered
because that court held the copyright to be invalid. See id. Consequently, the ques-
tion of whether ABC had permission is moot. See id.
22. See id. at 1095.
23. See id. at 1094. The district court also later denied ABC's motion for new
trial or for reconsideration of the bench ruling of copyright validity. See id.
24. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1094.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977). Generally, fair use is a privilege for people
other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material without the
owner's consent. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp.
55, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In determining whether a certain use is a "fair use"
within the meaning of the doctrine, the nature and objects of the selections, the
quantity and value of material used and the extent to which such use may diminish
the value of the copyrighted work is considered. See id.
26. Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1094.
27. See id. at 1095. "This court conducts a de novo review of the district
court's application of§ 101(1) to the facts of the case." Id. (citing Marco v. Accent
Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1548 (3d Cir. 1992); Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857,
861 (2d Cir. 1992)).
28. Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096-99.
29. See id. at 1099.
30. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). Reid set forth elements which, when applied to the
facts of a particular case, determine whether a particular work is one "made for
hire" under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). For a further discussion of the Reid case, see
infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
31. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1095-99.
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the normal scope of his business to hire independent contractors.3 2
Consequently, the work of interest was not "work made for hire,"
and therefore the copyright registration upon which Akey relied
was found invalid.33
III. BACKGROUND
The law defining the "work made for hire" doctrine is young
and developing.34 Originally, the "work made for hire" doctrine
was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909. 35 The Copyright Act of
1909, however, only addressed the doctrine in general terms.3 6 The
Copyright Act of 1976 (Act) sets forth the most recent formulation
of the doctrine.3 7
The 1976 Act for the first time codified the ideas of the doc-
trine in detail. 38 Unfortunately, the Act does not explicitly define
the term "employee," a determinative concept within the "work
made for hire" doctrine.3 9 Consequently, the courts became the
arbiters of this pivotal term, and several theories developed.4°
32. See id. at 1097-99.
33. See id. at 1099. Interestingly, the three hired assistants were not made
parties to the suit. Had Akey originallyjoined them as plaintiffs, he may have been
able to establish standing even when the work made for hire registration was held
invalid. At that point, he could have attempted to show, in the alternative, that it
was ajoint work. Alternatively, he may have been able to obtain common law copy-
right protection. This was never, however, mentioned by any court associated with
this case. Perhaps Akey felt that joining his assistants would have weakened his
argument that it was a valid work made for hire.
34. See generally W.F. PARV, LArrANs's THE CopRGrT LAw, 117-22 (6th ed.
1986).
35. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 Stat.
1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)).
36. See PATY, supra note 34 at 117-18.
37. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1977). Section 201(b) states that the employer
or person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes
of the copyright laws. Such work is known as "work made for hire." Section 101
states that a "work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compila-
tion, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977).
39. See id.
40. For a discussion of the various theories used by the courts prior to Reid,
see infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
1997]
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The determination of whether someone is an employee or in-
dependent contractor is crucial to an employer who is trying to pro-
tect his work under Section 101 (1) of the Act. Simply stated, if an
employer hires an employee for help on a copyrightable work, the
employer may register the copyright in the work as his own under
the "work made for hire" doctrine. 41 If, however, the employer
hires an independent contractor, the doctrine does not apply and
the work may not be registered by the employer as his own.42
In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed the reigning theories
on the issue.43 The Court set forth a test in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid44 to determine whether someone is an employee
within the meaning of the Act.45 The Reid decision became the
seminal case for determining whether a worker was an "employee"
or an "independent contractor."46
In Reid, an anti-homelessness association hired an artist to cre-
ate a sculpture. 47 The association developed the basic concept for
the sculpture, but the artist performed the actual creation.48 Upon
completion of the sculpture, the sculptor and the association each
argued that it owned the copyright for the work.49 Reid, the artist,
argued that he was an independent contractor and the copyright
for the sculpture therefore belonged to him.50 The association ar-
gued that the copyright belonged to them because Reid was an em-
ployee and the sculpture was therefore a "work made for hire."51
The Supreme Court granted certiorari52 to "resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals over the proper construction of the
'work made for hire' provisions of the Act."53
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1977).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1977). There are ways for an employer to copy-
right a work as one "made for hire" even when he has hired an independent con-
tractor, but the work must fall within the language of 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), which is
beyond the scope of this Note. For the language of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(1), (2), see
supra note 2.
43. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 751-52.
46. For a listing of several articles discussing Reid and its ramifications on the
"work made for hire" doctrine, see infra note 98.
47. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 730. The association in Reid was not for profit and
unincorporated. See id.
48. See id. at 733-35.
49. See id. at 735.
50. See id. at 736.
51. See id.
52. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 488 U.S. 940 (1988).
53. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736.
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The Reid Court examined the four lower court interpretations
then in existence for the definition of "employee" within the mean-
ing of the Act.5 4 The first interpretation was referred to as the
"right to control test."55 Specifically, this interpretation stated that
work "is prepared by an employee whenever the hiring party retains
the right to control the product."56
This test had been established earlier in Clarkstown v. Reeder.5
7
In Clarkstown, the township claimed that a handbook written for
them by the defendant was their property, and registrable as a
"work made for hire."5 8 The court stated that the crucial factor was
whether the alleged employer had the right to direct and supervise
the manner in which the writer performed his work.59 In consider-
ing this factor, the court found that the defendant was an employee
because he was under the control of the township at all times dur-
ing the creation of the handbook.60 The court consequently held
that the township owned the copyright as a "work made for hire"
because the defendant was an employee of the township.
6 1
The second test discussed in Reid was set forth by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.6 2 Under this test, "a work is prepared by an em-
ployee under § 101 (1) when the hiring party has actually wielded
control with respect to the creation of a particular work."63 This
standard is a slightly narrower variation of the first test, in which the
"right to control," as opposed to actual control, is all that is needed
to establish ownership.
54. See id. at 738-40.
55. Id. at 738 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985)).
56. Id. at 738.
57. 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Peregrine v. Lauren Corp.,
601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985) ("The view that a work for hire relationship exists
when an employer has the right to control the party doing the work has received
wide judicial acceptance.").
58. Clarkstown, 566 F. Supp. at 140.
59. See id. at 141 (citing M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPMGHT § 5.03(B) (a), at 5-
12 (1982)).
60. See id. at 142.
61. See id. at 142-43.
62. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
63. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739
(1989) (citing Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551). The Aldon court stated that the relevant
question was whether the "hiring author caused the work to be made and exer-
cised the right to direct and supervise the creation." Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551. This
test was adopted by other circuits. See, e.g., Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-
Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987) (adopting Aldon test); Evans
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.) (following Aldon).
1997]
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In Aldon, Aldon Accessories hired an independent contractor
to create statuettes for Aldon Accessories to sell in the United
States.64 Spiegel, Inc. began selling identical statuettes and when
Aldon discovered Spiegel's activity, Aldon Accessories sued Spiegel
for copyright infringement of Aldon Accessories' statuettes. 65
Although the employment situation admittedly did not meet the
requirements set forth in Section 101 (2) ,66 Aldon Accessories ar-
gued that the work was protected as "work made for hire" under
Section 101(1).67 The trial court agreed and found that the party
hired to produce the statuettes was under Aldon Accessories' con-
trol and supervision to the extent that an employer-employee rela-
tionship existed.68
On appeal, Spiegel argued that the statuettes were not pro-
tected because they were produced by an independent contractor
and therefore not registrable by Aldon Accessories as "work made
for hire."69 Specifically, Spiegel argued that regular employees and
independent contractors were treated separately under the Act.70
Spiegel reasoned that independent contractors are covered exclu-
sively by subdivision (2) of the definition provided in Section 101,
and any attempt to classify the contractors under subdivision (1)
was not consistent with the statutory language. 71 By Spiegel's rea-
soning, Aldon Accessories' works could only be considered works
made for hire if they fell within Section 101 (2), because that sec-
tion and that section alone addresses independent contractors. 72
The court rejected Spiegel's argument and upheld the lower
court's instruction which stated that a "work made for hire" is one
prepared by a person acting under the direction, supervision, and
expense of the hiring author.73
64. See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 549-51.
65. See id. at 549.
66. For the text of 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), see supra note 2.
67. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551. Section 101(1) states that "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment" is "work made for hire." 17
U.S.C. § 101(1) (1977).
68. See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. Section 101(1) addresses the case where an employee is hired to do
work for an employer where that employer wants to copyright the work as his own.
17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1977). Section 101(2) addresses the case where the person
hired is not an employee per se, but helps with works which fall into the categories
specifically listed in that section. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2) (1977). For the language of
these sections, see supra note 2.
72. See Aldon, 738 F.2d. at 551.
73. See id. The Second Circuit concluded by posing the test as a question:
"[I]s the contractor 'independent' or is the contractor so controlled and super-
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The third test examined in Reid was set forth by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Dumas v. Gom-
merman.74 This test established that the term "employee" only re-
fers to formal, salaried employees. 75 In Dumas, the successor-in-
interest of a graphic artist alleged that Gommerman had infringed
upon her late husband's copyrights. 76 The Ninth Circuit held that
a non-salaried graphic artist who performed work on a subject sug-
gested by the hiring party was not that party's employee for pur-
poses of "work made for hire" protection. 7 7 Further, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the degree of control exercised by the hiring
party is irrelevant.7 s
The final test examined in Reid stated that the word "em-
ployee" within Section 101(1) carries its common-law agency law
meaning.79 This was the view of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit as stated in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children
and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises.80 In Easter Sea4 the
court found that the Aldon test was inherently flawed.8' The Fifth
Circuit stated that the language in the Copyright Act does not sup-
port the "actual control" test of Aldon.82 The court concluded that
a work is "made for hire" only where the hired party is an employee
vised in the creation of the particular work by the employing party that an em-
ployer-employee relationship exists. [sic]. The latter is covered by subdivision
(1)." Id. at 552-53. Moreover, an independent contractor, if closely controlled, is
not really independent. The contractor is in fact an employee within the meaning
of the statute. For a detailed discussion of Aldon, see Elana L. Gershen, Comment,
The Works Made For HireDoctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act After Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Spiegel, Inc., 5 CARDozo ARTS & Er. LJ. 265 (1986).
74. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)
(citing Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989)).
75. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102.
76. See id. at 1095. Gommerman owned and operated an art gallery which
sold works created by Dumas' late husband, Patrick Nagel. See id. at 1094.
77. See id. at 1099.
78. See id.
79. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (citing Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and
Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987)). In Easter
Seal the Easter Seal Society contracted with a public television station to videotape
a parade and a musical recording session. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 324. Playboy
Enterprises later obtained and used part of the video in a production of their own.
See id. at 325. The Easter Seal Society sued Playboy for copyright infringement. See
id. The court held that the public television station hired by the Easter Seal Soci-
ety was an independent contractor, and the work was not protected as "work made
for hire" under Section 101(1). See id. at 337.
80. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 334.
82. See id.
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within the meaning of agency law,8 3 or where the parties comply
with the requirements of Section 101 (2).84 Moreover, the Fifth Cir-
cuit specifically rejected the Aldon test and created the more literal
interpretation of the 1976 Act.8 5
After examining these four tests, the Supreme Court held that
an "employee" within the meaning of the Act is one who meets the
definition of an "agent" under agency law, effectively accepting the
test set forth in Easter SeaL86 The Court rejected the "right to con-
trol" and "actual control" tests discussed previously because it found
that neither test is consistent with the text of the Act.87 Specifically,
the Court found that these tests are not consistent with the lan-
guage of Section 101 (1), and additionally, "distort the meaning of
the ensuing subsection, § 101 (2)."88 The Court relied on the fact
that Section 101 "plainly creates two distinct ways in which a work
can be deemed for hire: one for works prepared by employees, the
other for those specially ordered or commissioned works which fall
within one of the nine enumerated categories and are the subject
of a written agreement."89 The Court continued by stating that the
two tests at issue do not allow this dichotomy, and that the nine
specific categories set forth in Section 101 (2) would already be, in
83. See id. at 334-35. Generally, someone is an employee within the meaning
of agency law if he is hired by the principal/employer as a specific extension of
that principal/employer's own activity. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN AND WILLAM A.
GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, 1 (1979).
The basic theory of the agency device is to enable a person, through the
services of another, to broaden the scope of his activities and receive the
product of another's efforts, paying such other for what he does but re-
taining for himself any net benefit resulting from the work performed.
Id.
84. See Easter Seal 815 F.2d at 334-35. The Fifth Circuit recognized that "this
interpretation is a radical break from [the] doctrine under the 1909 Act, but [that]
there are good reasons for this break." Id. According to the Fifth Circuit in Easter
Seal the 1909 Act contained a presumption that in the absence of agreement to
the contrary, where an artist was paid to create a work, the solicitor of the artist
controlled the publication of copies. See id. at 325 (citing Yardley v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939)). The Fifth Circuit recognized that the
language of the 1976 Act was intended to modify the "work for hire" doctrine. See
id. at 327. The court then identified the dichotomy set up between the two subsec-
tions in Section 101, and stated that its interpretation of the Act is "the best inter-
pretation of the actual language of the 'work made for hire' definition of the 1976
Act." Id. at 335.
85. See id. at 334.
86. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751
(1989). For a discussion of the test set forth in Easter Seal, see supra notes 79-85
and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 741.
88. Id.
89. Id. For a listing of these nine categories, see supra note 2.
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most cases, "works made for hire" under Section 101 (1) if either of
the above two tests was used.90 Moreover, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the "language and structure of § 101 of the Act do not
support either the right to control the product or the actual control
approaches." 91
The Court also rejected the third test, namely that "employee"
refers only to formal, salaried, employees. 9 2 The Court wrote,
"[w]hile there is some support for such a definition in the legisla-
tive history .... the language ... cannot support it. The Act does
not say 'formal' or 'salaried' employee, but simply 'employee.' 9
3
The Court then reviewed the definition of agent within the
agency law.94 "In determining whether a hired party is an em-
ployee under the general common law of agency, we consider the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished." 95 The Court continued by listing twelve
factors relevant to the inquiry of whether control of the manner
and means existed. 96 These twelve factors, when applied to a set of
facts and combined with the overall notion of control, allow the
determination of whether an employee or independent contractor
relationship exists.97 The factors listed by the Court as relevant to
whether an agency relationship exists are: (1) the skill required, (2)
the source of the instrumentalities and tools, (3) the location of the
work, (4) the duration of the relationship between the parties, (5)
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party, (6) the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work, (7) the method of payment, (8) the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants, (9) whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party, (10)
whether the hiring party is in business, (11) the provision of em-
90. See id. at 741.
91. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 742 n.8.
94. See id. at 751.
95. Id. (citing Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Hilton that "an
employer-employee relationship exists if the purported employer controls or has
the right to control both the result to be accomplished and the 'manner and
means' by which the purported employee brings about that result." Hilton, 690
F.2d at 320. Though this definition is not the sole determining factor for purposes
of the "work made for hire" doctrine, it indicates the Supreme Court's position
that control of the result is key in determining whether an employer-employee
relationship exists. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
96. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
97. See id.
1997]
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ployee benefits, and (12) the tax treatment of the hired party.9 8
The Court concluded this section with a statement that "[n]o one
of these factors is determinative."99
After Reid, it may seem that the Supreme Court had clarified
the definition of an employee for purposes of the "work made for
hire" doctrine. 10 0 There is still, however, uncertainty in applying
agency law principles to the facts of individual cases. 10 1 Since Reid,
two Circuits have attempted to apply the Reid test in detail.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
cently attempted to apply the Reid test in Marco v. Accent Publishing
Co., Inc.10 2 The plaintiff, Marco, a photographer, worked for a
monthly trade journal owned by Accent Publishing Company.10 3
The Third Circuit found that Marco was an independent contrac-
tor, and held that his photographs were not "work made for
hire.' 0 4 For support the court cited the Reid factors, focusing par-
ticularly on the ninth element of the Reid test - whether the work
performed by the hired party was part of the regular business of the
hiring party.10 5 Generally, where the work done by a hired party
falls within the business of the hiring party, evidence exists for an
employee relationship. 0 6 The Third Circuit determined that
although the work done by Marco was indeed the type of work reg-
ularly done by the publishing company, the type of work was well
98. See id. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)
(1957)).
For a further discussion on Reid, see Corey L. Wishner, Note, Whose Work Is It
Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid in Defining the
Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine, 12 HoFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 393 (1995) (discussing current state of copyright law under Reid); Paul I.J.
Fleischut, Note, Work Made For Hire for the 1990s, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1093 (1989) (dis-
cussing Reid and its anticipated effects); Katherine B. Marik, Note, Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: New Certainty for the Copyright Work For Hire Doctrine,
18 PEPP. L. REv. 589 (1991) (suggesting that doctrine after Reid is more clearly
understood); Earl K. Messer, Note, The Restoration of Compromise: Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 18 N. Ky. L. REv. 97 (1990) (discussing Reid and
how it will affect copyright law).
99. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
100. For an illustration of the clarity thought to have been provided by the
Reid decision, see Marik, supra note 98.
101. For a discussion of this uncertainty, see infra notes 174-237 and accompa-
nying text.
102. 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
103. See id. at 1548.
104. See id. at 1552.
105. See id. at 1551. This is the ninth element of the twelve element test
presented in Reid. For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 86-99 and accompa-
nying text.
106. For a discussion of this area of agency law, see REuscHLE N, supra note
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suited for an independent contractor. 10 7 The court furthered this
reasoning and ultimately held that an independent contractor rela-
tionship existed. 10 8 Thus, although a straightforward application of
the "regular business" element would suggest a finding that an em-
ployee relationship existed, the Third Circuit simply decided that
the element instead supported the existence of an independent
contractor relationship. 10 9
In Aymes v. Bonelli,110 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit examined a case in which Aymes, a computer
programmer, filed a copyright infringement suit against Bonelli,
the owner of a swimming pool business."' Bonelli hired Aymes to
write software for Bonelli's swimming pool business. 1 2 Bonelli had
no significant computer programming experience. 1 3 The Second
Circuit held that the program was not a "work made for hire" under
the Reid test, thereby entitling Aymes to ownership of the copy-
right." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit relied pri-
marily on Bonelli's right to control Aymes, the level of skill
required by Aymes, Bonelli's financial treatment of Aymes, and
Aymes' right to assign other projects. 1 5 Ai in Marco, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the ninth
element of the Reid test, namely, whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party. 116 The court found that this
element carried little weight because computer software, even if its
purpose is to support a swimming pool business, is not a part of the
swimming pool business.117 Oddly, the court did not cite this ele-
ment as support for finding an independent contractor relation-
ship, but rather afforded it negligible weight."18
The court in Aymes, while following Reid, pointed out that
weight must be assigned to each element in proportion to that ele-
107. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. See id. at 859.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 862.
114. See id. at 864.
115. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862-64. The right to control the work is the gen-
eral consideration given in the Reid test. The remaining factors used by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Aymes were the first, fifth, eleventh, and twelfth factors given in Reid.
For a discussion of these factors, see supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
116. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (2d Cir. 1992).
117. See id.
118. See id.
1997]
13
Spadt: Work Made for Higher Understanding of the Copyright Act of 1976:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
204 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOuRNAL
ment's applicability to the facts of the particular case. 119 Addition-
ally, the court in Aymes stated that the factors should not "merely be
tallied but should be weighed according to their significance in the
case."120 The court reasoned that such a technique suggests a more
equitable result because it adjusts the elements to fit within the
facts specific to a particular situation.121
Hi-Tech falls in line behind Aymes and Marco as a case decided
after Reid in which proper application of the Reid test has been at-
tempted by a federal appellate court. 122 Hi-Tech, Aymes, and Marco
all illustrate that while Reid has tightened the criteria for applying
the "work made for hire" doctrine, it has not solved all of the
problems associated with this already confusing area of law.
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
At issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.123
was whether the assistants hired by the owner of Hi-Tech Video
Productions were employees within the meaning of the Copyright
Act of 1976.124 The Sixth Circuit identified the relevant
119. See id. at 861.
120. See id.
121. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. Where a court is asked to weigh factors, more
room is allowed for an equity argument. Where the test is cut sharply from a rigid
list of factors, less room is allowed for equity. "The district court in Aymes was
reversed in part because it 'tallied' rather than 'weighed' the relevant factors."
Ossola, supra note 9.
122. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d
1093 (6th Cir. 1995).
123. 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995).
124. See id. For a discussion of the facts of Hi-Tech, see supra notes 14-33 and
accompanying text.
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statutes125 and applied the Reid test to the facts of the
case.
126
The Reid test allows the court to determine whether an individ-
ual is an "employee" within the meaning of the Copyright Act of
1976 through the weighing of a nonexclusive group of factors.
127
The court found four of these factors applicable: (1) the extent to
which Akey controlled the work and the artistic ability required by
him during that control, (2) Akey's financial treatment of his assist-
ants, 12 8 (3) Akey's perceptions of his hired assistants, and (4)
whether the work performed by the assistants was a regular part of
Akey's business. 129
Prior to performing its analysis of the case, the Sixth Circuit
identified those areas where it believed the district court erred. 130
First, the court specifically rejected the district court's factual find-
125. See id. at 1096. Hi-Tech's certificate of copyright classified the video as a
.work made for hire." See id. at 1095. The court therefore identified the two rele-
vant sections of the United States Code. "[T]he Copyright Act of 1976 ('the Act')
considers the employer or person for whom the work was prepared to be the 'au-
thor' for purposes of copyright registration and ownership." Id. at 1095 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1977)). The court continued by supplying the statutory defini-
tion of "work made for hire":
Section 101 of the Act defines a 'work made for hire' in two ways: (1) a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation .... if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire ....
Id. at 1095 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1977)). Hi-Tech did not claim any written
agreement; therefore, the court was not concerned about Section 101(2). See id.
The court framed the issue by focusing on whether the video was prepared by
employees or independent contractors of Hi-Tech. See id. Since there was no
claim by ABC that the work was not prepared by the hired assistants acting in the
scope of their employment, that question was not addressed. See id. Moreover, the
question was simply whether or not the video was prepared by employees or in-
dependent contractors; if it was prepared by employees, the copyright would have
been held valid and infringed. See id.
126. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096 (citing Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). For a discussion of the Reid test, see supra
notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 86-121 and accompanying text (discussing Reid test and its
use).
128. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096. This is a combination of factor 7, the
method of payment; factor 11, employee benefits; and factor 12, the tax treatment.
For a discussion of these factors as explained in Reid, see infra notes 142-50 and
accompanying text.
129. The third factor listed above, Akey's perceptions of his hired assistants, is
not a factor explicitly stated in Reid. For a discussion of the introduction of this
factor, see infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text. For the list of factors set
forth in Reid, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
130. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096.
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ings on several of the Reid factors.'13 Contrary to the district court,
the Sixth Circuit found that Akey did not supply the equipment to
his assistants. 132 The Sixth Circuit also found that Akey did not re-
tain the right to assign his assistants additional projects. 133 Second,
the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning regarding its
application of the common law of agency. 134 The Sixth Circuit
stated that the district court misapplied several factors, and noted
that weight must be accorded to the factors in proportion to the
degree in which they are applicable to this case.135 After identifying
the problems with the district court's ruling, the Sixth Circuit dis-
cussed those factors of the Reid test which it found most
important.136
The first element discussed by the court was the extent to
which Akey controlled the work at issue and the artistic skill re-
quired by him during that period of control. 137 The Sixth Circuit
followed Reid by applying agency principles to the idea of control
over the "employee."13 8 Under this test, the right to exercise con-
trol over production is not completely determinative in the "work
made for hir6" analysis. 139 The court stated that while Akey did
have the right to control the "manner and means by which the
video was completed," he still relied on the skill of his assistants to
131. See id. The Sixth Circuit's review of the district court was de novo. See id.
at 1095. The district court found that Akey supplied his own equipment to his
assistants, and that Akey retained the right to assign additional work to his assist-
ants. See id. at 1096. The Sixth Circuit simply disagreed with the district court's
findings of fact. See id.
132. See id. at 1096. The district court found that Akey had supplied the
equipment used by his assistants because Akey supplied some photographic equip-
ment to his hired parties. See id. The Sixth Circuit found that because some equip-
ment was supplied by the hired parties, Akey did not supply equipment to them.
See id.
133. See id. The district court had found that Akey retained the right to assign
additional work to the assistants because there was no agreement to the contrary.
See id. The Sixth Circuit found that because Akey hired the men for this job specif-
ically, he did not retain the right to assign additional work. See id.
134. Id.
135. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096 (citing Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 861 (2d
Cir. 1992)). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit wrote, "it does not necessarily follow
that because no one factor is dispositive all factors are equally important, or in-
deed that all factors will have relevance in every case. The factors should not
merely be tallied but should be weighed according to their significance in the
case." Id.
136. See id. at 1097-99.
137. See id. at 1097.
138. See id. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 751 (1989)). For a discussion of applicable agency principles, see supra notes
86-121 and accompanying text.
139. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 742-43).
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accomplish those objectives. 140 This reliance on the skill of his as-
sistants led the court to find that Akey had insufficient involvement,
at least with respect to this element, for a finding that his assistants
were his employees.
1 4 1
The second element discussed by the court concerned Akey's
financial treatment of his assistants. 142 Three elements combine in
this area of inquiry: the method of payment, employee benefits and
tax treatment. 143 The court found that examination of these fac-
tors also favored a finding of independent contractor status.'"
Specifically addressing each of these three factors, the court began
with the method of payment. 1 45 While the court admitted that
Akey paid Mueller on a per diem basis, indicating an employee rela-
tionship, the court also noted that Mueller only worked for Akey for
five days. 14 6 The court then stated that such a short duration of
employment suggests independent contractor status. 147 The court
concluded its discussion on the method of payment by stating that
the evidence, overall, is indeterminate. 1 48 The court, however,
looked at the remaining two elements of this set and noted that no
benefits were provided to the assistants and no payroll taxes were
withheld.' 49 From this analysis the court found that this area of
inquiry, albeit a combination of three Reid factors, favors a finding
of independent contractor status.1 50
The third element relied upon by the Sixth Circuit for support
of its holding was Akey's statements.' 5 ' Though this factor was not
given in Reid as an appropriate element to examine, the Sixth Cir-
cuit supported its use of the element by stating, "[i] n applying the
common law of agency to copyright cases, the Supreme Court typi-
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1097. Specifically, the court held that "Akey's control of the
video production thus weighs in favor of finding an employer-employee relation-
ship, but not significantly, in light of the skill required of the assistants, as well as
the assistants' artistic contributions to the product." Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. The court stated, "[i]n virtually every case, a strong indication of a
worker's employment status can be garnered through examining how the em-
ployer compensates the worker . . . ." Id.
144. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097. Specifically, the court wrote, "[c] ontrary to
the district court's analysis, these factors weigh very heavily in favor of finding in-
dependent contractor status." Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
19971
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cally refers to the Restatement of Agency for guidance."152 The
court further explained that the Restatement considers perceptions
or understandings of the parties relevant to a worker's employment
status.153
At trial, Akey referred to his assistants as "freelancers," "in-
dependent contractors" and "subcontractors." 154 While the district
court did not weigh these statements heavily, these characteriza-
tions were used by the Sixth Circuit for support of its finding that
Akey did not recognize his assistants as his employees. 155
Finally, the court concluded with a discussion of the scope of
Akey's business in determining his assistants' status. 156 The court
stated that if the work is not a part of the hiring party's regular
business, the hiring party is more likely to hire an independent con-
tractor on a periodic basis than hire a full-time employee. 157 The
court also stated, however, that "similarity between the hiring
party's regular business and the hired party's work does not neces-
sarily weigh significantly in favor of finding an employer-employee
relationship." 58 The court then stated that because Akey could use
independent contractors to perform normal business, his hiring
three assistants was not particularly persuasive evidence that an em-
ployee relationship existed.' 59
After the main discussion of these four factors, the court briefly
noted that the record did not indicate the extent to which the work
was completed on Hi-Tech's property, whether Akey had discretion
over working hours, or whether the assistants had assisted Akey on
previous projects. 160 The court also noted that the fact that Akey's
assistants did not hire additional workers, and that Hi-Tech was in
business, do not carry any significance one way or another. 6 1 Fi-
nally, the court stated that such issues, in light of the facts of this
152. Id. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
752 n.31 (1989)).
153. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(i) (1957)).
154. Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097.
155. See id. The district court did not mention this element as a controlling
factor. See id. The Sixth Circuit, however, applied great weight to Akey's state-
ments, stating, "[t]his Court considers Akey's perceptions highly indicative of his
assistant's independent contractor status." Id. at 1098.
156. See id. at 1098.
157. See id.
158. Id. (citing Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir.
1992)). For a discussion of Marco, see supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
159. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1098.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1098-99.
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case, were not dispositive because neither suggested employee sta-
tus nor independent contractor status. 162
Judge Bell, writing for the majority, summarized the court's
holding as follows: "[tlhe economic treatment of the assistants, the
skill required of the assistants, and Akey's own perceptions of the
assistants' status compel the conclusion that Cline, Mueller, and
Cook were independent contractors." 163 Because the assistants
were independent contractors, and not employees within the mean-
ing of the copyright statute, the work was not one "made for
hire."1 64 Consequently, the copyright registration in the video was
held invalid, and the district court ruling was reversed. 165
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jones challenged the major-
ity's application of the Reid factors. 166 Judge Jones argued that a
correct application of the Reid factors finds that Akey's assistants
were employees within the meaning of the statute. 167 Judge Jones
noted that since Akey filmed the scene of the island from the air-
plane, edited the footage, and compiled the video from the edited
footage, Hi-Tech could indeed copyright the work as "work made
for hire.' 68 Judge Jones distinguished Hi-Tech from Reid, and ar-
gued that in Reid, the "employers" were non-artists in an anti-home-
lessness agency.' 69 In Reid, the non-artist association hired an artist,
Reid, to create a sculpture. 170 Judge Jones also stated that Akey did
maintain significant control over the final product. 17' In support of
this position, Judge Jones noted Akey's decision-making power over
which shots would be included in the final video, the order that
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1099.
164. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1099. For a discussion of the Copyright Act of
1976 and its definition of "work made for hire," see supra notes 2-3 and accompa-
nying text.
165. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1099.
166. See id. at 1099-1100 (Jones, J., dissenting).
167. See id. 1099 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Jones referred to Akey as an
employee of Hi-Tech. See id. 1099 (Jones, J., dissenting). This reference was op-
posed by the majority, which stated, "Akey is not an employee of Hi-Tech; Akey is
Hi-Tech." Id. at 1096. For a discussion of this difference of classification, see infra
note 194.
168. See id. at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
170. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1099 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Jones wrote that
in a case where the hired party brings with him all of the artistic ability involved in
the work, a court should perhaps find that the work is his own, and not that of the
hiring party. See id. at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting). Where the artist is hired by a
non-artist, it is not the place of the copyright law to give ownership of the work to
the non-artist, absent some other specific agreement to the contrary. See id. (Jones,
J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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these shots would be presented and the transitions between these
shots.172 Judge Jones concluded that the district court's finding
that nearly all of the creativity encompassed in the work was con-
tributed by Mr. Akey, should not be disturbed. 173
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. propa-
gates the inconsistent and unpredictable line of authority constru-
ing the "work made for hire" doctrine. Since the Reid decision, the
question of who is an employee within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act has been somewhat less difficult to answer. 174 The test
simply asks whether the hired party is an employee within the
meaning of agency law. 175 If he or she is an employee, then the
work is made for hire and protected by the Copyright Act.176 Con-
sistent application of this test, however, has been a challenge to
courts attempting to use it - and with inconsistent application
comes unpredictability. 177 This unpredictability finds its origins in
Reid, where the Supreme Court presented a laundry list of factors
but did not offer lower courts guidance regarding the use and
weight of each factor. 178 Add to this the further complication that
the Supreme Court did not state which factors should necessarily be
used in a given case, and uncertainty abounds. Examples of the
uncertainty created by this lack of specific direction are found in
Marco and Aymes. 179
172. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Jones wrote that Akey also "supplied
the cameras and other equipment .... completely controlled all aspects of hiring
and paying assistants .... " and was within his area of business. Id. (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
173. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
174. For a discussion of the Reid test and its definition of employee, see supra
notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
175. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
176. For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 86-99 and accompanying
text.
177. For a discussion of the vagueness that still exists within the Reid test
through an examination of Marco and Aymes, see supra notes 100-21 and accompa-
nying text.
178. For a discussion of Reid, see supra notes 43-99 and accompanying text.
179. For an example of judicial attempts to apply the Reid test, see Marco v.
Accent Publishing Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting ninth Reid
factor incorrectly); Aymes v. Bonellk 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying no
weight to factor instead of applying weight where factor supported finding of
independent contractor status).
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Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., Inc. well illustrates this uncer-
tainty.180 In Marco, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit misconstrued the ninth element of the Reid test,
which requires analysis of whether the work performed by the hired
party was part of the regular business of the hiring party. The court
took an element which, when applied to Marco, should have been
support for an employee relationship, and misapplied it to find an
independent contractor relationship.181 The court in its own opin-
ion recognized that the type of work done by the hired party was
within the scope of work typically done by the hiring party. The
court further admitted that this finding normally suggests an em-
ployee relationship. 182 Regardless of these admissions, the court
found that while the work was of the type regularly done by the
hiring party, it is work which is well suited for an independent con-
tractor. 183 Through this twist of logic, and independent of prece-
dential or statutory authority, the Marco court apparently decided
that the best way for a monthly trade journal to obtain photographs
is to hire independent contractors, not employees. The court im-
posed its own view of the hiring situation without regard to the Reid
test. Perhaps the court knew already what it was going to hold and
wished to garner as much support as it could for its position.
Whatever the reason, the misapplication of this element is cause for
concern. A court seems to be free to rule either way upon examin-
ing a particular element.
Aymes v. Bonelli provides another example of the problems cre-
ated where courts are given excessive freedom in deciding "work
made for hire" cases. 184 In Aymes, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit also addressed the ninth element of
the Reid test, among others, and determined that the element car-
ried no weight in the final determination of employment status. 185
The court determined that computer software design, even if its
180. For a discussion of Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., Inc., see supra notes 102-
09 and accompanying text.
181. It should be noted that the Third Circuit's holding in Marco seems quite
agreeable. However, that court's application of this particular element, while not
ultimately detrimental to Marco, is nonetheless cause for concern. For a discus-
sion of the ninth element of the Reid test and how it is used to differentiate be-
tween an employee and an independent contractor, see supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
182. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551. This notion makes sense because work
outside the normal scope is well suited for an independent contractor.
183. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551.
184. For a discussion of Aymes, see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
185. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
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purpose is to support a swimming pool business, is not part of the
swimming pool business.18 6 The court stated that this determina-
tion suggests that Aymes was an independent contractor. 187 How-
ever, the court chose to dismiss the element as negligible rather
than cite it as support for its finding of independent contractor sta-
tus. 188 Although the court ultimately did find that an independent
contractor status existed, it is nonetheless disturbing that a proba-
tive element can so easily be excluded because a court deems it
negligible.
While some flexibility in the application of the Reid test is gen-
erally a good idea, the dismissal or blatant misapplication of certain
elements can adversely affect the outcome of a particular case.
Flexibility within the bounds of reason and limited to the extenuat-
ing circumstances in a particular case is consistent with fairness.
However, even flexible rules can be broken. The application of the
Reid test in Aymes and Marco has shown that what one court sees as
irrelevant may in fact be relevant and persuasive support for the
opposing argument. What the Marco court began was finished by
the court in Aymes. Together those cases removed what predictabil-
ity this element may have possessed in its short life between Reid
and the Aymes and Marco decisions in 1992.
That agency law elements apply to the determination of who is
an employee within the meaning of the Copyright Act is undis-
puted after Reid.189 It is the application of agency law elements
which continues to be the stumbling block for courts attempting to
follow Reid.190 The Second and Third Circuits' varied and inconsis-
tent application of the Reid test discussed previously, apparently
gave the Sixth Circuit freedom to abuse the Reid test in Hi-Tech. Hi-
Tech, along with Aymes and Marco, illustrate that under the Reid test,
a court has considerable leeway in making "work made for hire"
determinations.
186. As with Marco, the court's ultimate ruling seems agreeable. However, the
Second Circuit's finding in Aymes that the ninth element should be afforded no
weight is cause for concern. That element can easily be used to support a finding
of independent contractor existence.
187. For a discussion of the ninth element of the Reid test and how it is used
to differentiate between an employee and an independent contractor, see supra
notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
188. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
189. For a discussion of the holding in Reid see supra notes 86-99 and accom-
panying text. Specifically, the Supreme Court wrote that an "employee" within the
meaning of the Act is one who meets the definition of an "agent" under agency
law. Rei 490 U.S. at 751.
190. For a discussion of the problems with consistent application, see supra
notes 100-21 and accompanying text
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In Hi-Tech, the Sixth Circuit applied the Reid test in an unpre-
dictable manner. 191 As such, the Reid test has grown from a fact-
sensitive test to a hyper-fact-sensitive test, allowing a court to rule
almost indiscriminately on any given copyright infringement action
brought under the "work made for hire" doctrine. 192 Reid sets forth
a list of elements to which facts are to be applied in conjunction
with recognized agency law principles.' 93 This seemingly simple
test did not, however, prevent the district court and the court of
appeals from reaching opposite results while applying the same law
to the same facts. 194
In its determination that Cline, Cook, and Mueller were in-
dependent contractors, the Sixth Circuit relied on four elements of
191. For a critical discussion of the Sixth Circuit's use of the Reid test in Hi-
Tech, see infra notes 195-237 and accompanying text.
192. The outcome which results from the application of the Reid test is ex-
tremely fact sensitive. Contemplate the application of the Reid test in Hi-Tech
where the "source of instrumentalities and tools" is to be considered. See Commu-
nityfor Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989). The district court in Hi-Tech
held that the hiring party supplied equipment to his hired photographer because
the hiring party supplied cameras. The Sixth Circuit held that the photographer
supplied his own equipment because that photographer supplied the necessary
airplane and computer. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir. 1995). Obviously, the Sixth Circuit is "cor-
rect" in its determination of the fact. However, where a weighing of evidence is
subjective, there is no exact standard for courts to follow. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, could easily rule consistently with the district court's finding in Hi-Tech,
and not be violative of the Supreme Court holding in Reid. See Ossola, supra note
9, at § 11(E) (discussing notion that Reid "would seem to make the authorship de-
termination highly subjective and potentially unbounded by any objective
standard.").
193. For a discussion of applicable agency law principles, see supra notes 86-
99 and accompanying text.
194. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit conducted a de
novo review of the trial court's findings. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1095 (citing Marco
v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992)).
One question to which the two courts did not agree was Akey's role in the
governance of Hi-Tech. The district court's dissent stated that Akey was an em-
ployee of Hi-Tech, and the majority, probably correctly, stated that Akey was not
such an employee, but was in fact Hi-Tech himself. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096.
Specifically, the majority wrote, "Hi-Tech is a business venture owned and oper-
ated solely by Akey. Thus, Akey is not an employee of Hi-Tech; Akey is Hi-Tech."
Id.
However, that statement raises the question of how Akey can be Hi-Tech if Hi-
Tech is incorporated. The corporation is an entity in and of itself, and Akey can-
not be that same entity. Because a detailed examination of business entity struc-
ture is beyond the scope and need of this Note, a simple statement on this issue
will suffice. The resolution probably lies in the fact that while laws of incorpora-
tion would recognize Akey as an officer of the company, agency law would recog-
nize him as the principal in the alleged principal/agent relationship. Thus for the
purposes of the case, Akey is viewed as the "principal," or the alleged "employer."
Neither side of the Hi-Tech court, however, addressed this distinction in any detail.
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the test proscribed in Reid.'9 5 The Reid test does not require all
twelve elements to be used in every case, and the Sixth Circuit se-
lected the elements which it thought were applicable to the facts
surrounding Hi-Tech's claim. 196
The Sixth Circuit looked first and most importantly to Akey's
control of the work and the artistic ability required by him during
that period of control. 97 Second, the court looked at Akey's finan-
cial treatment of his assistants. 198 Third, the Sixth Circuit placed
heavy emphasis on Akey's perceptions of his hired assistants. 199
Fourth, the court looked at whether the work performed by the
assistants was a regular part of Akey's business.2 0 0 The court's find-
ing that Akey's financial treatment of Cline, Cook, and Mueller sug-
gested the existence of an independent contractor relationship is
sound. However, the court's treatment of the first, third, and
fourth elements is both questionable and unsettling.
The court's treatment of these three elements raises concern
for the future predictability of the "work made for hire" doctrine.
The first area of concern is the majority's finding that Akey did not
control the production of the work sufficient to find that he was the
assistants' employer.2 0 1 This holding suggests that an employer is
unable to hire individuals with skill or artistic ability to help him
create a copyrightable work. The Sixth Circuit also overemphasized
Akey's perceptions of his assistants' status. Finally, the court's con-
clusion that Akey's business is well suited for hiring independent
contractors, though it is regularly involved with the creation of
195. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097-98. Not all twelve elements must be used in
the final determination of the hired party's status. For a discussion of how relevant
elements should be viewed with weight proportionate to their relevance, see supra
notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
The other elements examined were minor, and included the Sixth Circuit's
finding that they had little foundation in the record. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1098.
Specifically, they included the location of the work, the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work, the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants, and whether the hiring party was in business.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed these elements as either not being supported by
the facts, or lacking significance. For a discussion of the court's application of
these elements, see supra text accompanying notes 160-62.
196. For a discussion of the elements selected by the Sixth Circuit and that
court's application of the facts to those elements, see supra notes 122-173 and ac-
companying text.
197. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d
1093, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1098.
201. See id. at 1097.
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videos, is distressing. This finding raises serious doubt about the
effectiveness of this factor in predicting how a court will rule.
A. Participation in Production of the Work
The Sixth Circuit stated that Akey's participation in the video
production "weighs in favor of finding an employer-employee rela-
tionship, but not significantly, in light of the skill required of the
assistants .... "202 The court did not state what degree of participa-
tion would suffice to establish a significant role, such that an em-
ployer-employee relationship could be found. The Sixth Circuit
justified its belief that Akey lacked "significance" by noting that he
relied on his assistants' creative and artistic ability.20 3 While Akey
did rely on his assistants' abilities, it is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where a person would hire someone to do work in the hope
that the person hired would not contribute skill, creativity or ability.
Virtually all people hired to help with a creative work are hired for
their creative and artistic talents.
This assertion is evidenced by the Supreme Court's statement
in Reid that " [i] n determining whether a hired party is an employee
under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring
party's right to control the manner and means by which the prod-
uct is accomplished."20 4 Thus, a key factor in determining whether
a hired party is an employee, within the meaning of agency law, is
whether his artistic abilities are under the control of the hiring
party.205 In other words, where a hiring party controls the overall
creation by controlling the "manner and means" by which it is cre-
ated, the parties are in an employer-employee relationship.2 0 6 If
202. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1097.
203. See id.
204. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
205. Obviously, in any kind of employment relationship, whether it is an in-
dependent contractor relationship or employee relationship, the hired party is, in
a general sense, under the control of the hiring party. Here, the Supreme Court
has drawn a distinction between a general control of the hired party and a control
of the artistic aspects of the creation. For a general discussion of the general con-
trol element and its rejection, see supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text, and
supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of this control element and its place within the Reid test,
see supra note 95.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hilton Int'l Go. v.
NLRB stated, referring to the "manner and means" by which something is pro-
duced, that the "test is difficult to apply since the result is necessarily a function of
the manner and means employed." Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320
(2d Cir. 1982). Moreover, the resultant product is in existence because of the
manner and means by which it was produced. Even a strict use of the phrase
"manner and means" would require one to acknowledge that the skill and ability
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the "manner and means" by which something is produced includes
the artistic ability, skill and creativity of the ones producing it, then
the Supreme Court's consideration of the control of the "manner
and means" suggests that people hired to produce the work are in
an employer-employee relationship when their artistic abilities are
under the control of the hiring party.2 0 7 Certainly, where no such
control exists, a court should find an independent contractor rela-
tionship. In Hi-Tech, the Sixth Circuit wrote that Akey had con-
trolled the artistic aspects of the creation, 20 8 yet held that he lacked
the requisite control to establish that the assistants were his assist-
ants.2 9 This does not seem to be consistent with the Supreme
Court's position in Reid that a determination of employee status
should rest largely on a showing of control of the artistic aspects.2 10
This emphasis on the hiring party's control over the hired
party's artistic ability should not be confused with the Aldon test,
rejected by the Supreme Court in ReidY"1 In that case, the only
element examined was whether the hiring party controlled the
hired party.2 12 Here, in the application of this element, the ques-
tion is whether the hiring party controlled the artistic ability of the
hired party. The distinction between controlling the hired party
and controlling the artistic ability of the hired party is the differ-
ence between the Aldon test, rejected by the Supreme Court, and
the Reid test. In any case where one party hires another, the hiring
party retains some degree of control, however minimal. Important
in this analysis, however, is whether the artistic ability of the hired
party is directed, instructed, and otherwise controlled such that the
artistic aspects of the final creation are the result of the desires of
the hiring party.213
The Sixth Circuit found that Akey coordinated the entire pro-
ject from beginning to end, but held that Cline, Cook, and Mueller
of the producers of the resultant product played a role in the manner and means
by which that product was produced.
207. For a discussion of this analysis, see supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
208. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d
1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995).
209. See id.
210. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's position in Reid, see supra notes
86-99 and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of the Aldon test, see supra notes 62-73 and accompany-
ing text.
212. For a discussion of the Aldon case, see supra notes 62-73 and accompany-
ing text.
213. For a discussion of this analysis and its use by the Supreme Court, see
supra note 95.
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were not Akey's employees. 2 14 Akey controlled the creative aspects
of the tape and coordinated the efforts of all the people who
worked for him.21 5 In support of its holding the court stated that
although Akey controlled the artistic aspects of the work, he also
relied on the skill of his assistants. 216 Apparently, Akey would have
been unable to rely on the skill of his assistants and still claim the
work as one "made for hire."217 Akey, according to the record, did
everything short of the actual, physical, complete production, yet
lacked sufficient control to claim the work as his own.21 8 The Sixth
Circuit seems to have told Akey that he may not hire similar artistic
help on future projects like the Mackinac video and expect to ob-
tain a valid copyright registration.
To understand where the line should be drawn between in-
dependent contractor and employee, and to see why Hi-Tech may
have been incorrectly decided, it might help to examine cases in
which control of the artistic aspects of the work lacked to a degree
such that no employer-employee relationship existed. Judge Jones
pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Hi-Tech that Reid might be
a better demonstration of a situation in which the hiring party
lacked sufficient control because the hiring party was a non-artistic
anti-homelessness agency who hired an artist.219 Judge Jones be-
lieved that an artistically inexperienced and unskilled organization
214. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d
1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995).
215. See id. Akey was involved with every step of the creative and administra-
tive processes involved with the video. See id. Akey "coordinate [d] the entire pro-
ject from its inception to completion, the creative input into the tape, and
coordinate [d] the efforts of all the freelance people who worked with [him]." Id.
216. See id.
217. See id. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the fact that Akey controlled the
project effort, but found that this was outweighed by his assistants' abilities. See id.
The Sixth Circuit wrote, "[n]evertheless, while Akey may have had control of the
artistic objectives of the project, it is also true that Akey relied on the skill of the
artists .... ." Id. Of particular importance to the Sixth Circuit was the fact that
Akey's assistants had artistic ability. Hence, the Sixth Circuit here suggests that
those hired must not have artistic ability if the one hiring them wishes to claim a
"work made for hire."
218. See supra notes 102-210 (discussing Akey's role and fact that court held it
insufficient to establish ownership).
219. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting). Reid worked "in his
own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision of his activities from Washing-
ton [D.C.] practically impossible." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989). Additionally, Reid was an artist, and the court pointed
out that creating sculptures was not part of the regular business of the hiring party.
See id. These statements by the Supreme Court indicate that where the hiring party
is not himself an artist or at least not involved with the artistic aspects of the work
for which he has hired help, he cannot exercise the requisite control.
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could not exercise control over the artistic abilities of the hired art-
ist because they did not have the expertise necessary to do so. 22 0
Another edifying foil to Hi-Tech is Aymes v. Bonelli. Aymes exem-
plifies a situation in which the hiring party did not have sufficient
control of the hired party's skills to the extent necessary that the
doctrine should attach.221 In that case, a businessman with no com-
puter experience hired a programmer to design software for his
business, and the court held that the work was not one "made for
hire."22 2 In cases like Reid and Aymes, it is easy to accept that the
hiring party should not receive rights to the work because he did
not significantly contribute artistic skill or ability. Moreover, where
the hiring party has little or no experience in the "manner and
means" by which the work is created, it is clear that the hiring party
cannot sufficiently control the hired party in the artistic aspects of
the creation.2 23 In such a situation, it is fair to say that the work is
not one "made for hire."224
B. Perception of Hired Assistants
The majority in Hi-Tech also over-emphasized the importance
of Akey's perception of his assistants. First, the employer's percep-
tion of his workers is not a factor in Reid.225 The Sixth Circuit justi-
fied its introduction of this element by noting that it is included in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a factor in determining agency
existence. 226 In Reid, the Court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Agency as support for the factors given explicitly as relevant to the
determination of the type of employee relationship.2 27 In Hi-Tech,
the Sixth Circuit introduced this factor as an extrapolation of the
Reid test.2 2 8 Even if the application of this factor is a permissive
reading of Reid, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on it in
finding that the work was not one made for hire.
220. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting).
221. For a discussion of Aymes, see supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text,
and supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
222. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992).
223. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1100 (Jones, J., dissenting).
224. See id.
225. For a discussion of the Reid factors, see supra notes 86-99 and accompany-
ing text.
226. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's introduction of this element to the
Reid test, see supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
227. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752
(1989).
228. See Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d
1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995).
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The Sixth Circuit found Akey's statements "highly indicative"
of the assistants' status. 229 This construction places too much em-
phasis on Akey's words. The court further stated that it considered
"Akey's perceptions highly indicative of his assistants' independent
contractor status."230 The court is referring to Akey's reference on
the record to the assistants as his "freelancers," "independent con-
tractors," and "subcontractors."23 1 However, had Akey known that
his characterization of his assistants would harm him, he likely
would have spoken differently in court.23 2 Attaching extreme con-
sequences to the specific words of a layman when that layman lacks
knowledge of any profound meaning of those specific words seems
to place too much importance on those words. Had Akey known
the result of his word choice, it is likely that he would have referred
to the assistants as his employees.
The Sixth Circuit, by relying so heavily on this factor, actually
weakens its position that the assistants were independent contrac-
tors. When a person cites strong evidence and significant facts to
support his position, the objective scholar has a difficult time criti-
cizing. When a person points to certain facts for support and those
facts lack identifiable significance, that person's position is more
questionable. While a court often needs less support for its position
than a person to avoid criticism, some general principles nonethe-
less exist.
C. Whether Work Done is Part of Regular Business
The third criticism exists both with regard to the fourth ele-
ment used by the Sixth Circuit, and with regard to its reliance on
Marco v. Accent Publishing Co. The Sixth Circuit addressed the Reid
test's ninth element, whether the work done is part of the hiring
party's regular business. 233 Generally, if the work is within the
scope of the hiring party's regular business activity, support exists to
find an employee relationship. Conversely, if the work falls outside
the normal scope, it is assumed that an independent contractor has
229. See id. at 1098.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Akey could easily have referred to the men as his employees without
committing perjury. Akey is in court because he thinks the hired parties were his
employees and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. thinks the hired parties were independent
contractors. If he had called them his employees, the court could not have found
that he perjured himself because it would not have been until after the holding
was made that anyone, including Akey, knew that the men were contractors.
233. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1098.
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been utilized.23 4 The Sixth Circuit relied on Marco,23 5 stating that
although the work done was in fact within the normal scope of busi-
ness, the type of work done was well suited for an independent con-
tractor.2 3 6 In so doing, the court misapplied the element. Though
this result is inconsistent with the Reid test, it is typical when a list of
factors is given without guidance on how those factors should be
applied. Moreover, while the Reid test's ninth element might seem
to suggest the finding of employee status, it can just as easily be
construed by a court to support the finding of independent con-
tractor status.
The Sixth Circuit did examine all of the relevant factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Reid, Its application and conclusion,
however, are questionable. The Sixth Circuit justified some of its
conclusions with support from the record, but certain conclusions
lack strength.2 3 7 The Sixth Circuit's ruling in this case significantly
affects the "work made for hire" doctrine and employers who wish
to utilize it in the future.
VI. IMPACT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
made it difficult for many employers to obtain copyright protection
for work created with the help of hired assistants. While the court
was apparently trying to solidify this area of law, several questions
arise from its analysis in Hi-Tech. First, the degree of control over
the hired party necessary to establish an employee relationship is
not defined. Second, if people with artistic ability are hired to do
work and the hiring party wishes to register a copyright in that
work, what the hiring party should do to protect his claim is
uncertain.
The Sixth Circuit has left unanswered its own question con-
cerning the degree of artistic control the hiring party must exercise
if he wishes to claim his work as one "made for hire." Because the
Sixth Circuit stated that Akey did not have enough control over the
production of the video, while admitting that he "had control of
the artistic objectives of the project ... from its inception to com-
pletion .... ,,238 one must wonder how much artistic control the
234. See id.
235. For a discussion of Marco, see supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's use of that case in ruling on Hi-Tech, see
supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
236. See Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1098.
237. See id. at 1096-99.
238. See id. at 1097.
[Vol. 4: p. 191
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss1/8
WORK MADE FOR HiRE
hiring party must exercise. Apparently the court here wanted to see
less artistic ability on the part of the hired party. Such an expecta-
tion is unrealistic for artists who wish to hire assistants to aid them
in their work. The degree of control which the hiring party must
exercise to trigger protection from the doctrine, at least in light of
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hi-Tech, is unclear.
The other area of uncertainty surrounding the required de-
gree of control pertains to the supply of equipment to the hired
parties. The Sixth Circuit determined that Akey did not supply the
production equipment. 239 The courtjustified its factual conclusion
by stating, "Akey provided the camera for principal photographer
Mueller, but not the computer with which Mueller developed the
video's graphics." 240 The Sixth Circuit seems to be suggesting that
the hiring party must supply all equipment in order for the court to
conclude that he provided the equipment.241 The Sixth Circuit's
conclusion is arguably reasonable, but it does not answer the ques-
tion of how much equipment must be supplied.2 42 Because Akey
supplied some of the equipment to his assistants and the court
found that he did not supply production equipment to his assist-
ants, 243 an employer apparently must supply all or nearly all equip-
ment to his assistants to meet this requirement. However, no
explicit statement to this effect is made by the Sixth Circuit.
On a more general note, a troublesome aspect of this case is
the Sixth Circuit's apparent loss of the big picture. Had this case
followed the more common scenario of this type of litigation, the
hired assistants would be bringing an action against Akey in an ef-
fort to obtain their own registration. In such a case, it is wise to
determine critically, among two parties who both share an interest
in the work, who should own the rights to the copyright. In so do-
ing, it is important to look at the rationale underlying the "work
made for hire" doctrine. The underlying rationale is that the right
239. See id. at 1096.
240. Id.
241. The Sixth Circuit concluded that although Akey supplied the camera to
one of his assistants, he did not "suppl [y] the production equipment to his assist-
ants." Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1096. Therefore, the Hi-Tech court is stating, perhaps
implicitly, that all equipment must be supplied by the hiring party for this element
to support a finding of "work made for hire."
242. There is a basis for stating that Akey did not supply the equipment. It is
true that the aerial videographer supplied his own plane and that one hired man
provided his own computer. See id. However, Akey supplied the camera to one of
the hired men. See id. So there is also a basis for the finding of the district court
that Akey did supply equipment.
243. See id.
1997]
31
Spadt: Work Made for Higher Understanding of the Copyright Act of 1976:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
222 ViLLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
to exploit the copyrighted work should be assigned to the most de-
serving party. That is the reason the doctrine was developed. Here,
however, the litigants are a party who has an interest in the work as
at least a partial creator, and a party who used the work without any
kind of permission from anyone. Has the court lost sight of who is
suing whom for what, and instead rigidly and blindly applied mech-
anistic factors of a test in such a way as to ignore the values under
which the test was developed?
This whole problem may be eliminated in the future if the hir-
ing party uses the term "agent" in an employment contract. More
specifically, since courts now use agency law principles to deter-
mine if there is an employer-employee relationship, a hiring party
would benefit by constructing the contract for services as an agency
agreement. If the hiring party expressly hires an "agent" to assist
him in his creation, it is unlikely that a court could find an in-
dependent contractor situation. Although unlikely, a finding of in-
dependent contractor status is not beyond the realm of possibilities
- particularly if the elements of principal/agent relationship are
not met in fact.2 44 To lower the likelihood of litigation, the em-
ployer should insure that as much work as possible is done in ac-
cordance with the elements set forth in Reid.2 45 The hiring party's
initial efforts will be reaped in the end when he registers the work
as his own under the copyright laws.2 46
This interpretation of the "work made for hire" doctrine begs
the following question. Why should one who wishes to create some-
thing which was generally accepted as registrable by that party now
have to go through all of this work in order to insure his product is
protected? Perhaps the Sixth Circuit is trying to broaden the rights
of skilled and artistic members of the workforce. Perhaps the Sixth
Circuit is attempting, at the expense of Akey, to teach those in-
volved in this area of law that they should set up an explicit agency
agreement if they wish to enjoy copyright protection under this
doctrine. The Sixth Circuit is apparently not trying to reduce the
number of copyrights, for even work not "made for hire" is still reg-
istrable, in most cases, as a joint work or solely by the hired party.
244. For a discussion of these elements, see supra notes 86-99 and accompany-
ing text.
245. For a discussion of these elements, see supra notes 86-121 and accompa-
nying text.
246. For a general discussion of techniques for the proper construction of
employment contracts to insure copyright ownership, see generally, D. Peter Har-
vey, Structuring Employment Relationships to Insure Ownership and Control of Intellectual
Property, 403 Pu/PAT 35 (1995).
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The underlying reason seems to be one of sympathy for the work-
ing artist, and perhaps an attempt by the Sixth Circuit to decrease
the likelihood of possible future litigation. At this point, one thing
is certain. Cases litigated under the "work made for hire" doctrine
are so fact sensitive that there is no way to predict what a court will
hold. Until this area of law is settled such that the doctrine is pre-
dictable, those people who hire assistants for their creative abilities
might better refer to the statute as one defining "work made for
someone else."
Jonathan H. Spadt
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